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Classical uncertainty in predicting the future
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In this work we scrutinize the deterministic nature of globally hyperbolic space-times from the
point of view of an observer. We show that a space-time point q ∈ M that lies to the future of
an observer at p ∈ M , receives signals that are invisible (to be made precise) to the observer at p.
Part of the initial data on a Cauchy surface, required to predict what happens at q, is also invisible
to the observer at p. Therefore it is not possible for any observer to predict a future event with
certainty. The uncertainty increases as one attempts to predict further future. An observer at p
can access the entire data to determine what happens at q, if and only if q ∈ J−(p). Classical
uncertainty in prediction is not an intrinsic feature of the events in space-time. It adds up with the
usual quantum mechanical uncertainty to limit our ability to predict the future. We also suggest a
thought experiment to elucidate the subject.
PACS numbers: 04.20.Dw
A space-time (M, g) is said to be globally hyperbolic if
the diamonds J+(p)∩J−(q) are compact for all p, q ∈M ,
and strong causality holds at every point in M . Glob-
ally hyperbolic space-times admit Cauchy surfaces whose
domain of dependence is the space-time manifold itself.
Any signal sent to p ∈ M is registered on this Cauchy
surface. Therefore given initial conditions on this surface,
one should be able to predict what happens at any point
p that lies to his future. In this sense general relativity
is a deterministic theory.
The deterministic nature of general relativity was ham-
pered by the development of singularity theorems by
Penrose and Hawking [1]. According to these theorems,
the formation of singularities is inevitable as a result of
gravitational collapse. The presence of a singularity vi-
olates the condition of the compactness of the diamonds
J+(p) ∩ J−(q) for the space-time to be globally hyper-
bolic. Thus, one cannot define a Cauchy surface and
predictability breaks down. Cosmic censorship conjec-
ture was proposed to circumvent this obstacle [2]. This
conjecture states that the singularities that ensue as a
result of gravitational collapse are always surrounded by
an event horizon which disables their causal contact with
distant observers. Thus, one can ignore the breakdown
of causality at space-time singularities, since a distant
observer does not encounter any effects propagating out
of the singularities. Hawking argued that, there exists a
surface about which an observer can only have limited in-
formation such as mass, angular momentum and charge
when the singularity is covered by an event horizon. This
brings a limitation to our ability to predict the future,
even if the cosmic censorship conjecture is correct [3].
In this work we evaluate an observer’s ability to predict
the future in a globally hyperbolic space-time. We point
out that there exists a surface about which an observer
can access absolutely no information, and the data on
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this surface is required to predict what happens at a fu-
ture point. Therefore, it is not possible for any observer
to predict a future event with certainty. The uncertainty
increases as one attempts to predict further future. We
also show that an observer at p can access the entire data
to determine what happens at q, if and only if q ∈ J−(p).
We comment on the analogies and the discrepancies with
the usual quantum mechanical uncertainty principle. Fi-
nally, we suggest a thought experiment to elucidate the
subject of classical uncertainty.
We start with a simple lemma that leads crucial results.
Lemma 1. Let p, q ∈ M such that p < q. Let r ∈
J−(q) \ J−(p). Any past extendible causal curve from
r to q is entirely contained in J−(q) \ J−(p), i.e. in
Ext(J−(p)).
Proof. Assume a causal curve from r intersects J−(p).
Then there exists p0 ∈ J
−(p) such that r < p0 < p. This
implies r < p, i.e. r ∈ J−(p), which is a contradiction.
If a set of points are contained in Ext(I−(p)) (which is
equal to Ext(J−(p)) for globally hyperbolic space-times),
we define this set of points to be invisible to an observer
at p. (We adopt this definition from Galloway and Wool-
gar [4]). This definition is intuitive in the sense that infor-
mation flows along causal curves, and no information can
reach an observer at p from the region which we define as
invisible. Let us assume an observer at r ∈ J−(q)\J−(p)
sends a signal to q. This signal is represented by a fu-
ture directed causal curve that has a past end point at r.
Since, this signal is invisible to an observer at p, he/she
cannot include the effect of this signal in his/her calcu-
lations to predict what happens at q.
In globally hyperbolic space-times it is customary to
work with Cauchy surfaces. The next theorem states
that, at every Cauchy surface, there exists a region which
is invisible to an observer at p.
Theorem 2. Let S be any Cauchy surface for the space-
time M , or a partial Cauchy surface for p, q such that
2p < q. The region S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)) is non-empty and
invisible to p. Thus, the region S \ J−(p) is non-empty
and invisible to p.
Proof. If the sets S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)) and S \ J−(p) are
non-empty they are trivially invisible to p, since they are
both contained in Ext(J−(p)).
To prove that they are non-empty let us choose r ∈
J−(q)\J−(p) such that r lies to the past of S. By lemma
(1) any causal curve from r to q is entirely contained
in Ext(J−(p)). Since S is a Cauchy surface any causal
curve intersects S. Thus, for every r ∈ J−(q) \ J−(p)
that lies to the past of S, there exists s ∈ M such that
s ∈ S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)), i.e. s ∈ S \ J−(p).
Let us proceed with the results that follow from theo-
rem (2).
Corollary 3. Let S be a Cauchy surface for the space-
time M . No observer can access the entire initial data
on S.
Proof. An observer moves on a time-like curve. For each
point p on the curve there exists a future point q. The
result trivially follows from theorem (2), since S∩(J−(q)\
J−(p)), and S \ J−(p) are non-empty and invisible to
p.
It is not necessary for an observer at p to access the
entire initial on a Cauchy surface S to predict a future
event q, since S \ J−(q) is invisible to q itself. q only
receives signals from J−(q), and these signals are regis-
tered at S∩J−(q). Therefore the initial data on S∩J−(q)
is sufficient to determine what happens at q. A natural
question at this stage is whether an observer at p can
access the data on S ∩J−(q) to predict what happens at
q.
Corollary 4. It is not possible for any observer to predict
a future event with certainty.
Proof. Let p < q. By theorem (2) S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)) is
non-empty and invisible to p. Thus a subset of S∩J−(q)
is invisible to p. Therefore an observer at p cannot predict
what happens at q with certainty.
An observer at space-time point p can construct his
prediction about what happens at a future point q, upon
the initial data that is accessible to him, which is re-
stricted to S ∩ J−(p). There exists an uncertainty in
his prediction, since the region S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)) is
invisible to him, and the data in this region is required
to determine what happens at q with certainty. Let us
also investigate what happens as one attempts to predict
further future.
Corollary 5. The uncertainty increases as one attempts
to predict further future.
Proof. Let p < q1 < q2 . . . < qi < qi+1 < . . .. S∩(J
−(qi)\
J−(p)) is non-empty and invisible to p, q1, q2, . . . qi−1. We
have S ∩ (J−(qi) \ J
−(p)) = [S ∩ (J−(qi) \ J
−(qi−1))] ∪
[S ∩ (J−(qi−1) \ J
−(qi−2))] ∪ . . .∪ [S ∩ (J
−(q1) \ J
−(p))]
Thus the uncertainty in predicting qi+1 is larger than the
uncertainty in predicting qi.
The classical uncertainty in prediction is generated by
the region on a Cauchy surface that is invisible to an ob-
server. As an observer attempts to predict further future
this region enlarges, and the uncertainty increases.
The theorem (2) only applies to points that lie to the
future of an observer. This can be generalised to include
the whole space-time manifold.
Theorem 6. Let p, q ∈M such that p 6= q. An observer
at p can access the entire initial data on a Cauchy surface
S required to determine what happens at q, if and only if
q ∈ J−(p).
Proof. We consider the three possibilities: q ∈ J+(p), q ∈
J−(p), and q ∈M \[J+(p)∪J−(p)] = Ext[J+(p)∪J−(p)].
If q ∈ J+(p), we have proved that S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)) is
non-empty and p cannot predict what happens at q.
Let q ∈ J−(p). One should access the data on S∩J−(q)
to determine q with certainty. Since J−(q) ⊂ J−(p),
[S∩J−(q)] ⊂ [S∩J−(p)]. An observer at p can determine
what happens at q with certainty.
Let q ∈ Ext[J+(p) ∪ J−(p)]. Let r ∈ (J−(q) \ J−(p)).
One can proceed as in lemma (1) to show that any causal
curve from r to q is invisible to p. Let S be a Cauchy
surface. Again one can proceed as in theorem (2) to show
that S ∩ (J−(q) \ J−(p)) is non-empty and invisible to
p. An observer at p cannot determine what happens at
q with certainty.
Though an observer cannot predict a future event, he
can determine a past event by using the initial data on
a Cauchy surface, provided that he has an accurate the-
ory. An observer moves on a time-like curve. Therefore
a point at the future of an observer lies to his past after
finite time. Then it can be determined with certainty.
The point in determining a past event by using the data
on a Cauchy surface whereas one could simply observe
it, is that the former approach allows one to determine
the state of a system without interacting with the system.
In the original formulation of quantum mechanical uncer-
tainty Heisenberg suggests a thought experiment where
one measures the position of an electron by illuminating
it with gamma rays.(see e.g. [5]) This results in a distur-
bance of the momentum of electron, i.e. a simultaneous
determination of position and momentum is not possi-
ble. Heisenberg concluded that, this entailed the fail-
ure of classical causality at the quantum level [6]. If the
quantum mechanical uncertainty was to be interpreted in
terms of a simple measurement error and disturbance of
another quantity as in its original form, one could argue
that the classical causality still holds since it is possible
to determine a past event with certainty without observ-
ing it. However according to the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion, the quantum mechanical uncertainty is an intrinsic
feature of events. A physical quantity does not have a
definite value unless it is measured. On the other hand,
3the classical uncertainty in predicting an event described
in this work, cannot be interpreted as an intrinsic feature.
It merely stems from the fact that one cannot access the
entire initial data required to predict a future event. The
classical uncertainty derived in this work and the usual
quantum mechanical uncertainty are independent con-
cepts which add up to bring a limitation to our ability to
predict the future. However as far as past events are con-
cerned, we are only limited by the intrinsic uncertainty
imposed by quantum mechanics.
It is convenient to elucidate the concept of classical un-
certainty with a thought experiment. Let us assume that
we release a particle in a gravitational field. We have a
perfect classical theory to describe the dynamics of this
particle in the gravitational field, so that we can predict
the position, momentum or any relevant physical observ-
able at any time with absolute accuracy; apart from the
intrinsic quantum mechanical uncertainty. We make a
prediction at t = t0 to assign certain values to the physi-
cal observables at t = tb. Let us envisage that a package
of gamma rays were emitted from a distant galaxy a long
time before t0. These rays reach us at t = ta < tb to
interact with the particle and lead to deviations on the
world line of the particle. It is not possible for us to
include the effect of gamma rays in our calculations at
t = t0, since these rays are invisible to us at t = t0 as
discussed in lemma (1). If there exists a Cauchy surface
that is intersected by these rays, the relevant data on this
Cauchy surface is also invisible to us, as stated in theo-
rem (2). Our predictions for the state of the particle at
t = tb will be falsified. Since we cannot access the entire
initial data that influences a future event, there exists
a classical uncertainty in our prediction of the future in
addition to the usual quantum mechanical uncertainty in
the state of the particle.
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